Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access originally published online on May 13, 2009
Philosophia Mathematica 2009 17(3):369-377; doi:10.1093/philmat/nkp007
© The Author [2009]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
JODY AZZOUNI. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence and Truth
Conrad Asmus*
* School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia. conrad.asmus@gmail.com
JODY AZZOUNI. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence and Truth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 978-0-19-518713-7. Pp. vi + 248.
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1. Introduction
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Tracking Reason is an ambitious work touching on a vast range
of topics including (but not limited to): mathematical proof,
mathematical practice, the ontological commitment of theories,
nominalism, formalism, first-order
versus second-order logic,
logical consequence, reductive theories of logical consequence,
interpretational and representational theories of consequence,
syntactic accounts of consequence, Opacity to introspection
of the rules by which we reason (p. 207),
1 truth, truth
predicates, the transcendent nature of truth predicates, inter-translatability
of languages, deflationism, propositional quantification, inconsistency
in natural languages and regimentation of natural languages.
This abundant landscape of philosophy has a number of different
tracks for traversing it. As indicated by the subtitle of the
book, there are three main topics:
Proof,
Consequence and
Truth.
This provides the first way of reading the book. Azzouni argues
that the logic at work in different practices (particularly
mathematics) is often introspectively invisible to the practitioners.
A mathematical proof
. . . [Full Text of this Article]
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2. Truth
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3. Proof
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4. Consequence
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5. Regimentation and Paradox
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